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Through the decisions of the European Court of Justice (”ECJ”), human rights have been
placed at the forefront of the agenda of the European Union (”EU”). In analyzing the jurisprudence
of the Court, one is struck both by the substantive impact that it has had on the development
of human rights throughout the Union and by the procedural route through which this has been
accomplished. This brief Essay will attempt to highlight both of these developments and explore
some of the challenges that the Court faces as it confronts a vastly different world from that facing
Europe in 1957.
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Through the decisions of the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"), human rights have been placed at the forefront of the
agenda of the European Union ("EU"). In analyzing the juris-
prudence of the Court, one is struck both by the substantive im-
pact that it has had on the development of human rights
throughout the Union and by the procedural route through
which this has been accomplished. This brief Essay will attempt
to highlight both of these developments and explore some of
the challenges that the Court faces as it confronts a vastly differ-
ent world from that facing Europe in 1957.
At the close of World War II, when the promise of an inte-
grated Europe emerged, the repair of Europe, devastated both
economically and physically by the War, was the primary con-
cern.' The immediate focus was on economic integration and
the creation of a common market that would result in a higher
standard of living for all. Thus, when the Treaty of Paris,' which
created the Coal and Steel Community, and the Treaty of Rome
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1. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 2002). World War II left a power vacuum filled by not only the Soviet
Union and the United States, but also the Western European nations. See id. In order
to begin rebuilding Europe, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg created a cus-
toms union which led to a common trading area. See id. at 4; Treaty Instituting the
Benelux Union, Feb. 3, 1958, 381 U.N.T.S. 260 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1960). In
fact, Churchill advocated modeling a post-WWII Europe after the United States in a
speech given on Sept. 19, 1946 in Zurich. See T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE:
THE NEW SUPERPOWER AND THE END OF AMERICAN SUPREMACY 35-36 (2004). Churchill
urged, "[w]e must build a kind of United States of Europe." Id. at 36.
2. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
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("EEC Treaty"),' which created the European Economic Com-
munity ("EEC"), were adopted, little attention was paid to the
protection of human rights.4 Human rights were being ad-
dressed in other forums. One of the purposes of the United Na-
tions ("U.N.") was promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. In furtherance of
this purpose, one of the first resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948.1 The Genocide Convention was also adopted in 19486 and
the major U.N. covenants on human rights were then being de-
veloped.7 In addition, under the auspices of the Council of Eu-
rope, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") was signed in
1950 and was subsequently ratified by each of the original mem-
bers of the EEC.'
Although principally designed to further economic goals,
today, the EU, through its numerous directives and regulations,
3. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
4. Unlike the deliberations surrounding the drafting of the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for Europe in 2004, which were purported to be open and transparent,
the travaux preparatoires for the Treaty of Rome have not been disclosed. See generally
Christopher Engel, The European Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Changed Political Oppor-
tunity Structure and its Normative Consequences, 7 EUR. LJ. 151 (2001). Also see PETER
NoRMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL CONSTITUTION (2003) for a comprehensive description of
the deliberations and the issues addressed at the Convention that formulated the Draft
Constitution.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
7. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),
at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 49,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was a standard of achievement towards which nations
should strive. It was a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly and thus not binding.
The two human rights conventions were intended to convert the guarantees of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into legally binding obligations.
8. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220. The European Court of Human Rights sits
in Strasbourg, and individuals, as well as Member States, may take complaints of human
rights violations directly before the court. Jurisdiction over Member States is compul-
sory. All Member States of the European Union ("EU") and most potential members,
such as Macedonia, have ratified the Convention.
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has in effect legislated in broad areas that affect individual
rights. Throughout its fifty year history, the ECJ has decided
many cases which deal with fundamental rights such as non-dis-
crimination,9 freedom of religion,"° association 1 and expres-
sion. 12 Undoubtedly, in the next fifty years, with both the widen-
ing and the deepening of the Union, the Court will be faced
with new controversies involving human rights. Issues such as
the legality of anti-terrorist measures, standards to be applied to
expanded equality provisions, and restrictions on the movement
of persons and goods are certain to come before the Court.
As is well known, neither the Treaty of Paris nor the EEC
Treaty contains what can be considered a bill of rights. Al-
though the EEC Treaty does contain a Social Chapter which
gives limited mention to human rights and the protection of
workers rights, its primary focus is to improve working condi-
tions on a harmonized basis throughout the Community. 3 Spe-
cific individual rights that the EEC Treaty protects include the
freedom of movement and gender equality with respect to equal
pay for male and female workers. 4 Beyond the mention of
these principles, however, the EEC Treaty offers little to no pro-
tection in other areas of human rights, nor does it contain any
specific provisions to enforce these rights. 5 This stunning omis-
sion can best be attributed to the drafters' vision of the nature of
the institution being created; that is, one of limited competence,
primarily concerned with economic matters, that would not un-
duly encroach on the rights of the Member States. 6 As envis-
9. See Defrenne v. Sabena, Case 43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455.
10. See Prais v. Council, Case 130/75, [1976] E.C.R. 1589.
11. See Union Syndicale-Amalgamated European Pub. Serv. Union v. Council,
Case 175/73, [1974] E.C.R. 917.
12. See VBBB & VBVB v. Commission, Joined Cases 43 & 63/82, [1984] E.C.R. 19.
13. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, Title 11. Moreover, its provisions were aspira-
tional and called upon Member States to promote improved working conditions and an
improved standard of living.
14. See id. art. 48 (providing that "[flreedom of movement for workers shall be
secured within the Community"); id. art. 119 (providing that "[each Member State
shall . . . ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men
and women should receive equal pay for equal work").
15. See generally id.
16. The concept of competences in the EU is analogous to enumerated powers in
the United States. Specifically, a competence is:
The right to decide or legislate in a given field of activity. A competence is
described as either exclusive or shared, depending on whether the Commu-
nity has the sole authority to act or whether member states also have some
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aged in 1957, human rights were to be protected by individual
Member States through their national constitutions and laws.17
Indeed, each of the original members of the EU had strong
human rights protections in their national constitutions or
laws.18 In addition, since each Member State was also party to
the ECHR, the guarantees of the Strasbourg process were availa-
ble to its citizens.
This vision of fundamental rights protection, based on lim-
ited competence of the institution and alternate mechanisms
available for the protection of human rights, is strikingly similar
to the view that prevailed in the U.S. Constitutional Convention
of 1787.19 Human rights were hardly considered during the con-
stitutional debates at the Constitutional Convention held in Phil-
adelphia. The U.S. Constitution was intended to set forth a plan
of governance for the new nation and was to be a government of
enumerated powers. 2' As such, in the judgment of the Foun-
ders, protection of human rights in the federal charter was un-
necessary and was to be left to state constitutions and laws. 21
Both visions proved erroneous. In the United States, com-
mencing with the sweeping decisions of the Marshall court con-
jurisdiction. Under the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice ulti-
mately determines where a competence lies; the Court is entitled to rule in its
own favour when the supremacy of Community law over national law is in
dispute.
Euro-Know, A Concise Encyclopedia of the European Union: Competence, http://
euro-know.org/dictionary/c.html#competence (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). The term
competences" has been called "Euro-Speak." See Snoring While a Superstate Emerges?,
ECONOMIST, May 8, 2003, at 146.
17. SeeJoseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role
of the European Court ofJustice in the Protection of Fundamental Rights Within the Legal Order
of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (1986).
18. See Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 32-33 (1978).
19. See Donald J. Kochan, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the
"Law of Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153, 154-55, 168-69
(1998).
20. See id.
21. George Washington, the first President and a delegate to the Convention,
noted that having a Bill of Rights was considered by many to be quite useless in a system
where "the people evidently retained every thing which they did not in express terms
give up." However, Washington recalled, "there was not a member in the convention, I
believe, who had the least objection to what is contended for by the Advocates for a Bill
of Rights." Letter from George Washington to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 28, 1788), in 4
THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, at 400, art. 3, § 2, cl. 3, doc. 16 (Philip B. Kurland &




cerning extent of federal power through the Necessary and
Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause, federal authority has
expanded beyond the imagination of the original framers of the
Constitution.2 Similarly, the competence of the Union now en-
compasses environmental, consumer and investment protection
as well as health and education and other social and cultural
dimensions. In addition, it should be emphasized that neither
the doctrine of direct effect nor the doctrine of supremacy was
explicit in the EEC Treaty.2" Both of these far reaching princi-
ples were effected through decisions of the ECJ, thereby enlarg-
ing the authority of the EU over Member States and the compe-
tence of the ECJ itself.
While the United States soon corrected the lack of human
rights protections in the Constitution through the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, it is the ECJ that has been instrumental in
integrating human rights into the fabric of the Union. Indeed,
although the need for a specific list of human rights for the EU
has long been debated, it was only in 2000 that the Charter of
Fundamental Freedoms for the European Union was pro-
claimed. 4 The Charter not only explicitly reaffirms the rights
set forth in the European Convention but covers a range of
rights not included in the Convention, such as the right to good
22. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). "It has been truly said, that
commerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a unit, every part of which is
indicated by the term." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 194 (1824); see also SAMUEL H.
BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 224 (1993).
23. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 1112.
24. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. C
364/01 (2000) [hereinafter EU Charter]. In 1979, the European Commission pro-
posed that the European Communities accede to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, in 1996, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") held that unless the EC Treaty was amended, the Com-
munity did not have the power to accede to the Convention. The Court noted that, in
the absence of any such treaty provision, accession by the Community to the European
Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR") is beyond its power since it would result in a
substantial change to the Community's system for protection of human rights, entailing
the Community's integration into an institutional system where the provisions of the
ECHR would be incorporated into the Community law. Accession of the Community to
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265. In 1989, The Euro-
pean Parliament formulated a comprehensive catalogue of Fundamental Rights, but
this attempt to enact a bill of rights for the Union was also unsuccessful. See Hans Chris-
tian Krfiger, The European Union Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights:
An Overview, in THE EUROPEAN UNION CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, at xvii (Steve
Peers & Angela Ward eds., 2004).
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administration and social rights of workers. It is composed of a
preamble and chapters pertaining to dignity, freedom, equality,
solidarity, citizens' rights and justice, and incorporates fifty
paragraphs enumerating extensive rights. However, while the
Charter has political force it is not legally binding on Member
States.25 While other EU institutions, such as the Parliament and
the Commission, have now taken up the mantle of human rights
protections, it is the ECJ that must be credited with integrating
human rights into the acquis communitaire of the EU.
How has this been accomplished? In 1964, in order to en-
sure the uniform application of Community Law throughout the
Community, the ECJ enunciated the principle of supremacy of
Community law over the domestic law of the Member States, es-
tablishing a new legal order for Member States.26 While the EEC
Treaty, unlike the U.S. Constitution, does not contain a
supremacy clause, primacy of European law rests on two princi-
ples. The first is the "duty of loyalty" which enjoins Member
States to "take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfillment
of' the community's tasks. 27 The second principle is the duty to
"abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attain-
ment of the [treaty] objectives. '"28
At the outset, the supremacy doctrine was vigorously re-
25. The Charter was included as Part II in the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitu-
tion for Europe, O.J. C 310/1 (2004) [hereinafter Draft Treaty] that was not ratified. It
was intended to be legally binding on the Union and on Member States when they are
implementing Union law. Although not included in the text of the Reform Treaty of
Lisbon, it is referred to in the Treaty and is intended to be legally binding. Draft Treaty
of Lisbon (Reform Treaty), O.J. C 306/01 (2007), signed on Dec. 13, 2007 (not yet
ratified) [hereinafter Reform Treaty].
26. See Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 1 4.
27. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, art. 10, O.J. C 340/1
(1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
28. Id. The ill-fated Constitutional Treaty of 2004 did contain a primacy clause.
Article 1-6 provides, "[t]he Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the
Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the
Member States." Draft Treaty, supra note 25, art. 1-6. Although the existing primacy
doctrine does not extend to issues dealing with Common Foreign and Security Policy
nor with Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, the Draft Treaty would
have expanded the primacy doctrine to make it applicable across the entire range of
the Union's activities. See Anthony Arnull, The Draft Constitution: Issues and Analyses: The
Member States of the European Union and Giscard's Blueprint for its Future, 27 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 503, 508-09 (2004); Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structure of the Union
According to the Constitution for Europe: The Emperor is Getting Dressed, 29 EUR. L. Rv. 289,
311 (2004).
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sisted by some Member States particularly when matters affect-
ing human rights were at issue. While the EEC Treaty contained
very limited human rights provisions, the constitutions of Mem-
ber States were for the most part adopted subsequent to World
War II and contained human rights provisions modeled on doc-
uments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
U.S. Bill of Rights and the French Declaration on the Rights of
Man.29 Thus, it was unacceptable to some Member States to im-
plement community legislation without scrutinizing it through
the lens of their own constitutional guarantees of fundamental
rights. Indeed, the German Constitutional Court in 1967 held
that since the Community legal order lacked specific protection
of human rights, the transfer of power from the German legal
system to the Community had to be measured against domestic
constitutional provisions.
In what has been characterized as "an exercise of bold judi-
cial activism,"' 31 the Court held in a series of cases that funda-
mental rights of individuals were enshrined in the general prin-
ciples of Community law protected by the Court, and that funda-
mental rights form part of the Community law,32 which is
"inspired" by the constitutional traditions of Member States. 31 It
further held that in addition to constitutional provisions, rights
found in international agreements which the Member States had
collaborated on or were a party to are relevant in the Court's
analysis. 34 The substance of these decisions has now been incor-
porated into the subsequent treaties of the EU. For example,
the Single European Act of 1987"5 urges all Member States to
29. See HENKIN, supra note 18, at 32-33. The French Constitution of 1958 was an
anomaly in that, apart from the right to equal protection, there were few fundamental
rights specified in the text of the Constitution. For a description of the integration of
fundamental rights in France, see Bruno de Witte, The Past and Future Role of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(Philip Alston ed., 1999).
30. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 18,
1967, 22 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerchts [BVerfGE] 223 (1967)
(F.R.G).
31. Weiler, supra note 17, at 1105.
32. See Stauder v. Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 427.
33. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Ge-
treide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 4.
34. See generally Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491.
35. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending EEC Treaty).
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work together to promote democracy on the basis of fundamen-
tal rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Mem-
ber States, in the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and European Social Char-
ter, notably freedom, equality and social justice. The Treaty on
the European Union, adopted in 1992, converts this concern for
human rights into an obligation of the Union .6 Finally, the Am-
sterdam Treaty, adopted in 1999, now formally incorporates fun-
damental human rights into the institutions of the EU.37 The
Treaty provides that the "Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention ... as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, as general principles of Community law." 38
Initially, it should be noted that the term human rights ap-
pears rarely in the case law of the ECJ. The term is used when
referring to international treaties, such as the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights. 3 9 Rather, the ECJ re-
fers to "fundamental rights" as general principles of Community
law that must be protected by the Court. These general princi-
ples of Community law are construed by the Court more broadly
than the rights contained in international human rights conven-
tions and include not only those rights but also rights recognized
in the constitutional law of Member States.4°
Some commentators have suggested that the fundamental
rights doctrine of the ECJ was primarily motivated by the Court's
desire to protect the supremacy doctrine enunciated by the
36. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union, OJ. C 321 E/1
(2006) [hereinafter TEU] (the treaty was originally signed in 1992).
37. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 27, art. 6.
38. Id.
39. Human rights clauses are also contained in agreements with third countries.
See Philip Alston &J.H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a Human Rights Policy,
9 EUR.J. INT'L. L. 658, 688-95 (1998). Alston and Weiler note that the EU has played a
large role in non-EU countries by supporting human rights and democratic initiatives.
Human rights clauses are now included in over fifty Community agreements mainly
dealing with trade or foreign aid.
40. See generally de Witte, supra note 29. Unlike Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force
Oct. 24, 1945), which permits the International Court of Justice to use general princi-
ples of law in determining what the law is, the EEC Treaty explicitly allowed the ECJ to
apply general principles in very limited circumstances. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art.
215.
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Court from being rejected at the national level.4 ' While to some
extent a valid observation, it is also clear that the Court's activist
posture with respect to human rights was a response to the in-
creasing capacity of the Community to regulate and affect
human rights. What is undisputed is that the ECJ has played a
central role in shaping the human rights discourse and the trea-
ties that now incorporate human rights protection.42
The influence of the Court on the substantive development
of human rights law can be illustrated through its decisions in
the area of equality and non-discrimination and cannot be over-
stated. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty provided in its first para-
graph that "[e] ach Member State shall ... maintain the applica-
tion of the principle that men and women should receive equal
pay for equal work. '43 In 1976, a female worker, relying on Arti-
cle 119, challenged a work policy that paid male airline stewards
more than females for the same work.44 The ECJ ruled that Arti-
cle 119 had a "direct effect" on Member States and that an indi-
vidual had a right to sue not only Member States or instrumen-
talities but also private actors in state courts whether or not do-
mestic legislation implementing Article 119 existed.4"  This
ground breaking decision was notable not only because it enun-
ciated the direct effects doctrine but also because the ECJ elabo-
rated on the nature of Article 119. It acknowledged that the
[P]rovision forms part of the social objectives of the Commu-
nity which is not merely an economic union, but is at the
same time intended by common action, to ensure social pro-
gress and seek constant improvement of the living and work-
ing conditions of their people .... This double aim, which is
at once economic and social, shows that the principle of
equal pay forms part of the foundations of the Community.46
In subsequent cases, the ECJ expanded the equality principle
into a general equality right between men and women which ex-
ists at the core of EU law and has provided the basis for the en-
compassing regulations and directives in the area of gender
41. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 1137.
42. See de Witte, supra note 29, at 866.
43. EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 119.
44. See Defrenne v. Socite anonyme belge de navigation aerienne Sabana, Case
43/75, [1976] E.C.R. 455.
45. See id. 1.
46. Id. 10.
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equality.47
The Amsterdam Treaty has expanded the scope of the
equality principle and allows the Council to take action to com-
bat "discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation."48  In a recent
case, the Court stated that the principle of non-discrimination
on the grounds of age "must thus be regarded as a general prin-
ciple of Community law."49 Thus, a German law that permitted
short term employment contracts for persons over 52 years of
age was challenged as violating a Community Directive that set
forth a general framework for combating discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation
in employment.5" In ruling that the law was in conflict with the
Directive, the Court noted that the Directive "does not itself lay
down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employ-
ment and occupation .... IT] he source of the actual principle
underlying those forms of discrimination being found ... in vari-
ous international instruments and in the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States." 1
In recent years, the ECJ has effectively incorporated not
47. For example, Council Directive No. 75/117, O.J. L 45, at 19 (1975) provided
for equal pay "for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed." Article
119 of the EEC Treaty referred to "equal pay for equal work." EEC Treaty, supra note 3,
art. 119. In Jenkins v. Kingsgate Ltd., Case 96/80, [1981] E.C.R. 911, 22, the Court
upheld the validity of the directive. The Court noted that the directive, "which is princi-
pally designed to facilitate the practical application of the principle of equal pay out-
lined in Article 119 of the treaty in no way alters the content or scope of that principle
as defined in the Treaty." The concept of pay has been construed broadly by the Court
to include travel privileges and voluntary redundancy payments. See Barber v. Guardian
Royal Exchange Assurance Group, Case 262/85, [1990] E.C.R. 1-1889; Garland v. Brit-
ish Rail Eng'g Ltd., Case 12/81, [1982] E.C.R. 359; see also ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EURO-
PE.N UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 547-49 (2006). For example, between 1975 and
1992, the Council adopted six different directives: (1) the Equal Pay Directive of 1975;
(2) the Equal Treatment Directive of 1976; (3) the 1978 Social Security Directive; (4)
the 1986 Directive on equal treatment in occupational social security schemes; (5) the
1986 Directive on equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity
including agriculture in a self-employed capacity and on the protection of self-em-
ployed women during pregnancy and motherhood; and (6) the 1992 Directive on the
protection of pregnant women from exposure to hazardous substances in the work-
place and on rights to maternity leave. See Sonia Mazey, The European Union and Women's
Rights: From the Europeanization of the National Agendas to the Nationalization of a European
Agenda, J. EUR. PUB. POL'" 131, 140 (1998).
48. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 27, art. 13.
49. Mangold v. Helm, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981, 75.
50. Council Directive No. 2000/78, O.J. L. 303/16 (2000).
51. Mangold, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981, 74.
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only the provisions of the ECHR, but also the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights into its human rights jurispru-
dence. It has recently cited The Charter on Fundamental Free-
doms52 and noted that the while the Charter is not legally bind-
ing, the principle aim of the Charter is to reaffirm rights as they
result from constitutional traditions and international obliga-
tions common to Member States, the Treaty on the European
Union and the European Convention on Fundamental Rights
and Freedoms.53
It has been noted that the ECJ has drawn fundamental
rights from the unwritten law of the Community and that simi-
larly "could hold that the Charter of Fundamental Rights codi-
fies these unwritten fundamental rights of Community law."5 4
Thus, just as the European Convention has become part of the
acquis communitaire of the EU through decisions of the ECJ and
subsequent treaty incorporation, the Charter might similarly
achieve this status through decisions of the ECJ.55
This integration of human rights under the leadership of
the ECJ is particularly striking since, as noted earlier, there is no
specific provision in the EEC Treaty affecting human rights of
individuals. Further, although the EEC Treaty contains provi-
sions for judicial review, the provisions were intended to protect
against encroachments by the Community on the rights of Mem-
ber States and to guarantee that the Community would not over-
step its jurisdictional limits. Judicial review could not be viewed
at that time as affording protection to individuals for violations
of human rights.56
What are some of the challenges facing the ECJ today in the
area of human rights? While the ECJ has been instrumental in
52. See generally European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, Case C-
540/3, [2006] E.C.R. 1-5769.
53. See id. 1 38.
54. Engel, supra note 4, at 153.
55. Although most commentators have advocated that the EU accede to the ECHR
and adopt the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union, Advocate Gen-
eral Francis G. Jacobs has voiced skepticism that neither should be adopted by the
Union. See Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Court ofJustice: The Impact of European Union Accession
to the European Convention on Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 291 (Ingolf Pernice, Juliane Kokott, & Cheryl
Saunders eds., 2006).
56. See Weiler, supra note 17, at 1111.
2008] THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE AT FiFTY
ensuring the protection of fundamental rights within the legal
order of the Union, it must still grapple with the standards that
are to be applied when evaluating measures in light of human
rights concerns. There is still no comprehensive bill of rights for
the EU. Thus, the Court must continue to define and set forth
standards for the protection of human rights throughout the
Community.57 Further, the Amsterdam Treaty has expanded the
concept of equality beyond gender equality to include age, disa-
bility, sexual orientation and religion. The Court will no doubt
be increasingly called upon to interpret the equality principle in
those areas as well. 58
Although the Court applies the principles of the ECHR and
cites decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the
Court technically is not bound by such decisions and will pre-
sumably insist on the jurisdictional right to interpret the Con-
vention itself. Thus the question of possible conflicts between
the European Court of Human Rights and the ECJ remain.59
The Court must resolve the issue of possible conflicts of in-
ternational obligations with community measures, provisions of
the European Convention and indeed with provisions of the
EEC Treaty itself. In several recent decisions, the Court of First
Instance ("CFI") was faced with a challenge to community mea-
sures that, pursuant to resolutions of the U.N. Security Council,
froze the assets of the Petitioners without a hearing.6" These
measures were challenged as violating both the ECHR and provi-
sions of the EEC Treaty. The CFI affirmed the supremacy of
57. See generally de Witte, supra note 29.
58. See Mangold v. Helm, Case C-144/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-9981 (where the ECJ
ruled in a case involving Member State legislation that was challenged as violating a
council directive prohibiting age discrimination); see also Sebastian Krebber, The Social
Rights Approach of the European Court of Justice to Enforce European Employment Law, 27
COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'YJ. 377 (2006).
59. The literature on potential for conflict between decisions of the ECJ and deci-
sions of the European Court of Human Rights is voluminous. See Alston & Weiler, supra
note 39; Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible
Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19
DICK. J. INT'L L. 301 (2001); Vernon Valentine Palmer, Protecting Human Rights Within
the European Union: Who is Better Qualified to do the Job-The European Court ofJustice or the
European Court of Human Rights?, 20 TUL. EUR. & Crv. L.F. 73 (2005); see also Hoechst
A.G. v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2859; Niemietz v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97 (1993), Eur. Ct. H.R. 13710/88
(1992).
60. See Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int'l Foundation v. Council, Case T- 306/01, [2005]
E.C.R. 11-3533; Kadi v. Council, Case T- 315/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649.
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Security Council Resolutions and held that the court has no au-
thority to call into question, even indirectly, the lawfulness of
Security Council Resolutions in light of Community.
61
With the enlargement of the European Union and the in-
crease in movement of persons across borders, actions of Mem-
ber States in response to security and other concerns must be
evaluated against human rights standards of the EU.62 Thus, for
example, the action of a Member State that allows for swift de-
portation of immigrant members of an EU country deemed a
threat to public safety comporting with EU standards might ulti-
mately come before the Court.6 3
Finally, as the Court is called upon to decide an increasing
number of cases that deal with human rights, the issue of access
by private litigants and public interest groups to the ECJ might
be addressed. Article 230 of the EEC Treaty, which permits indi-
viduals to challenge community measures, requires that the al-
leged violation of fundamental rights, is "a direct and individual
concern."64 This requirement has been interpreted very strictly
by the ECJ and comparatively few cases dealing with fundamen-
tal rights are brought to the Court. While a treaty amendment
would be required to allow public interest groups to litigate
human rights issues, the Court might itself reconsider its previ-
ous jurisprudence with respect to access.65
61. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649. In both cases, the
Court of First Instance ("CFI") upheld the sanctions regime of the United Nations and
found objections based on violations of fundamental right to be beyond the jurisdiction
of the Court. The CFI did reserve one area of judicial review. The Court held that if
the Community measures are mandated by Security Council decisions, the EU regula-
tions will be examined, not for compliance with obligations under the ECHR, but
rather compliance with jus cogens norms. The Court stressed that decisions of the Se-
curity Council must be enforced even if they violate treaty obligations such as those
occurring under the ECHR. Both cases have been appealed and are awaiting disposi-
tion by the ECJ.
62. Alston and Weiler have noted, "the challenges posed by enlargement are not
only structural or size-related. With enlargement, the Union will be importing a new set
of unresolved minority issues as well as additional human rights challenges, whose solu-
tions will test the strength of many Community policies." Alston & Weiler, supra note
39, at 672.
63. Italy has recently attempted to expel Romanian nationals after a murder oc-
curred in which it was alleged that Romanians were implicated. This action has been
challenged by Romanian officials as violative of the rights of EU citizens. See Italian
Expulsions Wory Romania, BBC NEws, Nov. 6, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/eu-
rope/7079769.stm.
64. de Witte, supra note 29, at 875.
65. See Alston & Weiler, supra note 39, at 709-10; de Witte, supra note 29, at 875-83.
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These and other challenges will undoubtedly be faced by
the Court. If the challenges are met with the same scholarship,
care and innovation that the Court has exhibited in the past, one
can rest assured that human rights are in good hands.
